Nuclear Proliferation and the Erosion of Arms Control
The treaty architecture that constrained nuclear weapons weakens faster than it is renewed
Gradient 3 / 5 — set by the shallowest enabler, not the average.
| Enabler | Family | Weight | Maturity | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear & SMR | technological | moderate | 3/5 | ○ candidate constraint | |
| Weapons Autonomy & Dual-Use Systems | technological | large | 4/5 |
Notation
M = Nuclear Proliferation and the Erosion of Arms Control E = 2 enablers · 0 human · 0 2 technological g = min(E) = 3 bound = Nuclear & SMR (candidate)
Momentum
Self-reinforcing in the unhelpful direction: each lapsed instrument lowers the cost of letting the next one lapse.
Independent of technology?
Yes. This is a diplomatic trend; modernisation programmes follow it rather than cause it.
Clock reading
Four systems absorb this at four speeds. The distance between them is the adaptation gap.
- Individuals — months: Absent from daily awareness, which is itself part of the mechanism.
- Companies — years: Not the relevant actor.
- Governments — decades: Decades — and the instruments now lapsing took decades to build.
- The biosphere — not ours to set: The tail risk that ends every other clock in this book.
What would prove this wrong
A successor treaty capping the two largest arsenals, or a review conference producing an agreed outcome after three consecutive failures.
What this pushes on, and what pushes on it
Pushed on by:
- amplifies Autonomous and Asymmetric Warfare · Conventional asymmetry raises the incentive to hold an unmatched deterrent.
- amplifies Institutional Decay of the Multilateral Order · Arms control is the multilateral function most exposed to institutional failure.
See the cascade → · See it in the map →
impact by domain (social, environmental, economic, geopolitical) — not yet written. Published as missing rather than hidden.